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THE MEANING OF CONDONATION IN THE
LAW OF DIVORCE
FRANK EUGENE READER*

The doctrine that the condonation of a marital offense, constituting a
ground for divorce, will bar the condoning spouse from thereafter relying on
that offense to obtain a divorce, had its origin in the English Canon Law, being
applied by the Ecclesiastical courts in the disposition of petitions for divorce a
mensa et thoro.' From an early period in this country condonation was applied
by the courts as a defense to divorce, it being recognized and received as a part
of the common law.2 Today condonation is specifically mentioned in the divorce
statutes of twenty-seven states. For the most part these provisions are brief and
general in terms and have had little or no effect upon the decisions, the courts
construing such provisions as merely declaratory of the Canon Law doctrine; 8
and it has been held that the doctrine will be applied even though no mention
4
is made of it in the divorce statute.

There are many subsidiary rules and ramifications of the doctrine; such as
the rule that condonation is conditional upon the wrongdoer thereafter treating
the injured spouse with conjugal kindness; 5 that there can be no condonation
without knowledge of the nffens e6 tht it
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*A. B., The College of Wooster, 1928; LL. B., University of Pennsylvania, 1931; Professor of
Law, Dickinson School of Law, 1932-; Member of Pennsylvania Bar.

1Worsley v. Worsley, 2 Lee 572, 161 Eng. Rep. 444 (1730); Beeby v. Beeby, I Hag. Eec.
7S9, 162 Eng. Rep. 755 (1799).
The case of Durant v. Durant, 1 Hag. Ecc. 733, 162 Eng. Rep.
734 (1825), contains a full and excellent discussion of the law of condonation as administered by
the Ecclesiastical courts.
2Anonymous, 6 Mass. 147 (1809); Delliber v. Delliber, 9 Conn. 233 (1832).
8See 2 Vernier, American Family Laws (1932) 79, for a resume of the statutes. The California statute has a very complete provision as to condonation and the statutes of Montana, North
Dakota, and South Dakota are copied from it.
4Turnbull v. Turnbull, 23 Ark. 615 (1861) ; and see cases cited infra from District of Columbia,
Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, in none of which states is there
any statutory provision concerning condonation.
5Robbins v. Robbins, 100 Mass. 150, 97 Am. Dec. 91 (1868) ; Mosher v. Mosher, 16 N. D.
269, 113 N. XX.99 (1907); Holt v. Holt, 77 Fed. (2) 538 (1935).
6Rogers v..
Rogers, 122 Mass. 423 (1877); Frank v. Frank, 99 Pa. Super. 183 (1930).
lRex v. Rex, 39 Ohio App. 295, 177 N. E. 527 (1930); Leech v. Leech, 82 N. J. Eq. 472,
89 Ad. 51 (1913).
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inferred so easily against the wife;8 and so forth. Obviously the first question
that needs to be answered in applying the doctrine is what amounts to condonation? Does condonation refer to a mental state, or words, or acts? Is it merely
forgiveness, or is it conduct, or both? It will be the purpose of this acticle to
discuss these questions and its scope will be confined to the problem of what constitutes condonation.
FORGIVENESS AS CONDONATION

Text writers invariably speak of condonation as the forgiveness of a marital
offense, 9 and the decisions abound with language indicating that "condonation"
is synonomous with "forgiveness". For example it is said, "Now condonation
is forgiveness legally releasing the injury; it may be express or implied, as by the
husband cohabiting with a delinquent wife, for it is to be presumed he would
not take her to his bed again unless he had forgiven her";1 0 or, "Condonation is
forgiveness. . . such intention may be expressed in words, or it may be implied from
the act of the injured party;"" or, "Forgiveness, or condonation, as it is usually
termed, may be expressed or implied."' 12 Does this mean that condonation is
simply "forgiveness" in the ordinary or lay sense of the term; which denotes to
cease to feel resentment against one or to pardon him for a wrong committed? If
that is the true meaning, condonation is merely a mental state and could be shown
by express words of pardon or might be shown by conduct indicating a cessation
of resentment or ill will. Do the actual decisions bear out this construction of
the term?
Three decisions sustain this meaning of condonation. The case of Thompson
v. Thompson 13 is a square holding that condonation is merely forgiveness in the
above sense. There the parties entered into an agreement to the effect that the wife
was willing to forgive the past and they were to resume the marital relation.
The wife retracted and marital relations were not resumed. The court held that
the agreement itself was a condonation of all prior offenses, thus barring the
wife from a divorce for the husband's prior desertion. Bush v. Bush 14 and Phinizy
v. Phinizy'5 are in accord, but they are weakened somewhat by the fact that there
SShackleton v. Shackleton, 48 N. J. Eq. 364, 21 Atd. 935 (1891); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 193
Iowa 153, 185 N. W. 62 (1921).
9"Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense", Madden, Dom. Re. (1931), 300. "Condonation is the defense that the plaintiff after knowledge of the offense, forgave it." Peck, Dom. Rel.
(1930), 170.

10Beeby v. Beeby, supra note 1.
11Sayles
v. Sayles, 41 R. I. 170, 103 Atl. 225 (1918).
2

1 Quincy v. Quincy, 10 N. H. 272 (1839).
1349 Nev. 375, 247 Pac. 545, 47 A. L. R. 569 (1926).

The court said, "Condonation, as that
word is used in divorce suits, is merely a forgiveness-by the aggrieved spouse of past offenses."
14135 Ark. 512, 205 S. W. 895, 6 A. L. R. 1153 (1918).

15154 Ga. 199, 114 S. E. 185 (1922).
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was evidence in both cases which would have supported a finding that the parties
had resumed marital relations after the offense; and, in the former, the court said
that words alone could not be enough unless acted upon by resuming to some extent the marital relation, and then proceeded to hold that the wife's walking three
miles to their former home was sufficient resumption. 16 It is submitted that the
rule of these cases is not sound as a matter of policy. A wife who has been
wronged by the adulterous philanderings of her husband, out of compassion
elicited by the memory of happiness together in former days or simply out of the
goodness of her heart, may say, "I forgive you your weakness and will hold no ill
will against you, but I cannot go on living with you as your wife." Should her
forgiveness, even though the husband remains faithful thereafter, deprive her of
the right to terminate legally a relationship which her husband cruelly breached?1 7
We can admire a husband or wife who is big enough to forgive his or her spouse
for destroying that which was sacred, but we can have little respect for one who,
after knowledge of such misconduct, receives the adulterer to conjugal embraces;18
yet these cases would penalize a spouse who does the former by imposing'a legal
duty to submit to the latter. 19 Such a rule is not consonant with human nature or
the rudiments of fair play and these decisions which propound it are the unfortunate result of a literal application of the loose and general language of prior

16

1n Merriam v. Merriam, 207 Ill. App. 474 (1917), cited in the Thompson case, it was said
that the wife's drunkenness and desertion was condoned by the husband's agreement that if she

would leave and not drink for three months she could resume living with him, she having performed
and he having refused to take her back. This, however, was but dictum since the court had already
held that the wife's prior judgment for separate maintenance was conclusive against the husband
on the question of desertion and drunkenness, and that the ground of drunkenness was not made
out anyway. See Teal v. Teal, 324 I11.
207, 155 N. E. 28, 33 (1926).
l7As Lord Chelmsford said, in Keats v. Keats, I Sw. & Tr. 334. 164 Eng. Rep. 754 (1859),
at 764. "Those who felt that perpetual separation must be the inevitable consequence of the unpardonable fault, might still anxiously desire to lighten the load of despair by some kind words of
consolation and peace. This is not the forgiveness which amounts to condonation, but rather which
declares it to be impossible."
18As one court quaintly put it, "A husband who admits his wife to conjugal embraces after he
knows that she has committed adultery, is looked on as a disgraced man- 'a cuckold, a beast with
horns.' '" Pearson, J.,in Home v. Home, 72 N. C. 530 (1875).
19By the rule of these cases verbal forgiveness is a condonation and has the effect of legally
wiping out the offense of adultery. If that is the law, if the wife thereafter refuses to live with
him it would be desertion; or if she lived with him, but withheld intercourse she would, in
some jurisdictions, be guilty of cruelty or desertion. Desertion; Baker v. Baker, 99 Ore 213, 195
Pac. 347 (1921); Klein v. Klein, 146 Md. 27, 125 At. 728 (1924); contra, Wacker v. Wacker,
55 Pa. Super 380 (1913). Cruelty: Nordlund v. Nordlund, 97 Wash. 475, 166 Pac. 795 (1917);
Compare Currie v. Currie, 162 So. 152 (Fla. 1935); contra, Johnson v. Johnson, 31 Pa. Super. 53.
(1906).
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cases and of a failure to analyze the actual decisions and to appreciate the real problem involved.20
A study of the decisions discloses that these are the only cases which have
actually held that forgiveness alone or, in fact, that anything short of the resumption of marital cohabitation 2' can constitute condonation. In the English case of
Crocker v. Crocker22 and in several American cases it has been squarely held that
though the marital offense was admittedly forgiven there was no condonation because there was no marital cohabitation.23 Further, many cases have held that there
must be marital cohabitation to constitute condonation, without deeming it relevant or necessary to consider the presence or absence of forgiveness.2 4 A
modification of the requirement of marital cohabitation is suggested in a few
cases where it has been said that sexual intercourse is not always essential to
condonation, the courts pointing out that if such was the rule the circumstances
might be such as to render a condonation impossible, as where the injured spouse
20Keats v. Keats, supra note 17, was the first English case to state fully the nature and elements
of condonation. There the Lord Chancellor affirmed the Judge Ordinary's charge to the jury, to
the effect that forgiveness alone is not enough but that there must be a restoration of the offending
spouse to the same position she occupied before the offense, saying, "But words, however strong,
can at the highest only be regarded as imperfect forgiveness, and unless followed up by something
which amounts to ..... .a
reinstatement of the wife in the condition she was in before she
transgressed, it must remain incomplete." In Bush v. Bush, the court quoted this language and adopted the implication that condonation is merely forgiveness, but must be acted upon to be irrevocable.
Thompson v. Thompson, and Phinizy v. Phinizy cite and quote from the Bush case for their authority and also quote forgiveness language from various sources. In the latter case the court said,
"Sexual intercourse is not a sine qua non of condonation .....
if this were not the case, the
impotent husband could never condone the wife's divorceable offenses." True, but does it follow
that his mere forgiveness alone should wipe out the offense?
21
"Cohabitation", literally, means merely "to dwell together" and does not always imply sexual
intercourse. However, when the courts employ the term "marital cohabitation" or the phrase "living together as husband and wife" they usually use it as meaning sexual intercourse. To avoid any
ambiguity, whenever the term "marital cohabitation" is employed in the body of this article it shall
be understood as including one or more acts of sexual intercourse.
22[19211 P. 25.
2
$Taber v. Taber, 66 At. 1082, (N. J. Eq., 1904); Goeger v. Goeger, 59 N. J. Eq. 15,
45 At. 349 (1900); Anderson v. Anderson, 89 Neb. 570, 131 N. W. 907 (1911); and see
Christensen v. Christensen, 125 Me. 397, 134 At. 373 (1926), where it was said, "To be effectual,
condonation must include a restoration of the offending party to, or a continuance of, all marital
rights ..... the offended party may forgive, in that he may not bear any ill will, yet withhold a
complete reconciliation in the sense of reinstating the offender to conjugal cohabitation and full marital rights."
24
Letters of affection, Forrester v. Forrester, 101 Miss. 155, 57 So. 553 (1912) ; an offer by the
wife to return to her husband, Quarles v. Quarles, 19 Ala. 363 (1851); or even living together
in the same house or room do not constitute condonation so long as full marital rights are withheld,
Massie v. Massie, 202 Iowa 1311, 210 N. W. 431 (1926); Greenwell v. Greenwell, 98 At. '53,
(R. I., 1916); Faulkner v. Faulkner, 90 Wash. 74, 155 Pac. 404 (1916); Hartnett v. Hartnett,
59 Iowa 401, 13 N. W. 408 (1882); Elder v. Elder, 139 Va. 19, 123 S. E. 369 (1924). And
see cases cited in note 27 infra, holding intercourse to be necessary.
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was impotent.25 If such a principle is confined to cases of physical impossibility it
would seem proper to hold that a restoration of all marital rights insofar as that
is possible and to the full extent that they were enjoyed prior to the offense is
sufficient; though it might well be required that such living together should
be for some period of time before it could be given the effect of an act of sexual
intercourse. 26 The statement that condonation is simply forgiveness is then
without support in reason or law and the too common practice of employing
language to that effect is misleading and confusing and is to be deprecated.
CONDONATION WITHOUT FORGIVENESS

It having been determined that forgiveness alone is not condonation there
remains the further question of whether there need be any forgiveness at all. That
is, it marital cohabitation is necessary to condone a marital offense is it such intercourse alone which precludes a party from a divorce, or is it such action coupled
with and preceded by forgiveness which raises the bar? With respect to this it will be
found that a number of the cases 27 which hold that there can be no condonation
without intercourse treat the intercourse as proof of forgiveness. They indicate
that it is the forgiveness which is important, but that forgiveness, cannot be
clearly or sufficiently proved without proving marital cohabitation. These cases are
not satisfactory in that they do not consider the problem that arises where
there is intercourse, but admittedly no forgiveness. That intercourse, and nothing
short of it may be treated as adequate proof of forgiveness is one thing; the
converse, that intercourse shows forgiveness, isnot necessarily true. A husband
or wife may take his or her errant spouse into conjugal relations for reasons and
prompted by motives entirely disassociated from the intention to forgive. Thus a
husband after learning of his wife's infidelity may have no compassion or kind
feeling towards her and intend to leave and divorce her, but decides to exact his conjugal dues before he does. A wife may remain and cohabit with her husband long
26See Keats v. Keats, supra note 17; Phinizy v. Phinizy, supra note 15; Cramp v. Cramp, [1920]
P. 158 (Eng).
261t is suggested in Cramp v. Cramp, [1920] P. 158, 166, that if the husband tells his adulterous
wife that he will continue to live with her and thus preserve an impression of marital harmony to the
public, but that marital relations shall never be resumed, this living together will constitute condonation. This, however, does not seem wholly fair to a husband who later finds he cannot continue the
sham but feels he should cease giving his name to a woman whose misconduct renders her undeserving
it was held that though the parties lived in the
of it. In the cases in note 24 supra and note 27 infra
same house and even slept in the same bed, after knowledge of the offense, it would not be condonation if in fact there was not intercourse.
27
Marshall v. Marshall, 55 App. D. C. 173, 3 Fed (2d) 344 (1924); Truitt v. Truitt, 154 II.
App. 242 (1910); Clague v. Clague, 46 Minn. 461, 49 N. W. 198 (1891); Giles v. Giles, 181
N. E. 505 (Mass. 1932), but compare Holsworth v. Holsworth, infra note 33. Compare: Rudd
v. Rudd, 66 Vt. 91, 28 AtI. 869 (1894). Occasional dicta is found to the effect that there must be
both forgiveness and marital cohabitation: see Martin v. Martin, 92 So. 46, 49 (La., 1922).
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enough to obtain some personal benefit, material or otherwise, before she
denounces him and leaves. Will such conduct be ineffectual as a bar to his or
her divorce because it was not prompted by forgiveness?
In a very early Massachusetts case 28 it was held that intercourse constituted
condonation, the court saying, "If afterward he will cohabit with her as his wife,
he exhibits conclusive evidence of his forgiveness." If, as the court says, intercourse is conclusive of forgiveness and forgiveness is condonation the court has
either adopted an absurd conclusive presumption, for intercourse does not always
show forgiveness, or else it gives the forgiveness a connotation not in keeping
with its ordinary meaning. Actually the case holds that intercourse alone and
unaccompanied by any particular mental state is condonation barring the party
from a divorce, 2 9 and nothing can result except confusion by calling it proof
of forgiveness. This case was approved and followed in Delliber v. Delliber30 ,
an early Connecticut case. In neither case was there any evidence or contention
that the libellant did not intend to forgive the respondent by his act, but it is apparent in both that such a contention would have been of no avail.
In recent years a few courts have met the problem of intercourse without
forgiveness in a more realistic and practical manner. They have dispersed the fog
enveloping the doctrine as a result of forgiveness terminology and have simply
identified condonation with the principle of election. In Rogers v. Rogers31 the
Chancellor found that the libellant had had sexual intercourse after the adultery
complained of and that he at no time forgave her in the sense that he wiped
out the past. The court held it was nevertheless a condonation and said,
"Ifthe essence of condonation is forgiveness in the usual signification* of that word, then the conduct of the petitioner in this case
does not amount to condonation.
But I conceive that, although the etymology of the word and its definition and use by many courts imply forgiveness, the application of
the principle of condonation to proven facts by our own and other
courts is with no reference whatever to presence or absence of forgiveness . . . I think that, if we treat the doctrine of condonation
as based upon the election of the offended party to forego the remedy
which a full knowledge of the offense enables him to apply if he
2

SAnonymous, 6 Mass. 147 (1809).
29The further language of the court strengthens this conclusion: "If therefore a husband, believing his wife's guilt, will afterwards cohabit with her, whether infuenced by his compassion or his
affection, or induced by her tears, her penitence, or her fascination, he cannot afterward avail himself
of that offense to obtain a dissolution of the marriage." 6 Mass. at 149.
309 Conn. 233 (1832).
'167 N. J. Eq. 534, 58 AtI. 822 (1904), affirmed 63 Ad. 1119 (1906), but on the ground
adultery of respondent not proved. Approved in Leech v. Leech, 82 N. J. Eq. 472, 89 AUt. 51,
(1913).
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will, we will be able more readily to reconcile the decisions of courts
upon this subject."
82
In England a similar case was presented in Cramp v. Cramp where the
respondent admitted that her husband never forgave her though he did cohabit
with her after her adultery. The court held that there was condonation saying,
"A man cannot at the same moment exercise the rights of a husband and disclaim
the continuance of the marriage bond." Judge McCardie, after quoting from many
English cases in which the word "forgiveness" occurred, concluded that such
emphatic use of the word tends to obscure the true meaning of the doctrine of
condonation and concluded, "It will be found, I think, that the truer definition of
condonation is that it is a conditional waiver of the right of the spouse to take matrimonial proceedings, and it is not forgiveness at all in the ordinary sense." The Massachusetts case of Holsworth v. Holsworth3 is a similar holding.
This approach to the problem is commendable for its- fairness and certainty.
There seems to be no good reason why it should be necessary for a spouse to forgive the other a breach of marital vows in order to estop the former from later
calling up that offense to terminate the marriage. Where a wife has committed
adultery and the husband knows that fact why should he not be required to choose
between a continuance of marital cohabitation and the right to a divorce? This is
no hardship. It does not require him to make a hasty decision or promptly proceed
for a divorce. It merely requires him to refrain from conjugal embraces if he wishes
to retain the power to divorce her. Looking at the situation realistically, it is the
adultery that terminates the marriage and not the subsequent proof thereof in the

law '; it The divorce decree it merely an adijdiration in law of the terminntinn

of a marriage that was terminated in fact by the adultery. Continued marital cohabitation by the husband after such factual termination of the marriage no more
deserves the stamp of approval, moral or legal, than intercourse after divorce; unless we treat it as a waiver of the offense and as a factual reinstatement of the
marriage by mutual consent. For the court to say you may have a divorce since
you did not forgive her is to countenance sexual intercourse after the termination
34
of the relationship which gave legal and moral sanction to that conduct. The
82[1920] P. 158.
There the wife returned and cohabited with her
38252 Mass. 133, 147 N. E. 578 (1925).
husband for the purpose of taking her child from the father and with no intention of forgiving him.
And see Turnbull v. Turnbull, 23 Ark. 615 (1861) where the court said the husband's voluntary
cohabitation was an election, but also said that he "forgave" her and having forgiven her he could
not later retract.
34The husband may have been motivated by anything except forgiveness but, nevertheless
the court may and should import to him the intention to preserve the marital ties where he in fact
continues the basic incident of marriage, rather than import to him the intention to engage in immoral conduct. In Cramp v. Cramp [1920] P. 158 (Eng.) it was said, at p. 170, "A man cannot,
I think, use the body of his wife for sexual ends and announce to her at the same time that he will not
forgive her adultery, but will present a petition to dissolve the marriage bond. Such acts of inter.
course would be immoral unless the woman he embraced be still his wife."
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court must either do this or hold that since the husband chose to continue the
marriage in fact the relationship of husband and wife was in fact restored and is
legally existent and inseverable. Any other doctrine would be disruptive of morals
and hazardous to the welfare of issue that might result from the acts of the husband after discovery of the wrong.
Further, the rule of these cases has the practical advantage of being certain
and easily applied, and it eliminates the difficult task of delving into the mental
state of the libellant and determining whether he bad forgiven and ceased to
hold resentment towards the guilty spouse. So far as the authorities are concerned
no decision has been found which has held that condonation did not result from
marital cohabitation because there was no forgiveness, except where a statute
expressly required both cohabitation and forgiveness. 36 On the other hand many
cases have held that such cohabitation is condonation without bothering to consider the presence or absence of the intent to forgive, the courts simply taking it
for granted that condonation is made out by proof of intercourse after knowledge
of the offense.136 Yet despite the obvious soundness of the doctrine that forgiveness need not be shown and the many decisions applying the doctrine, in
fact, if not in words, the courts persist in emphasizing the element of forgiveness.3 7 Though the statutes, following judicial language, usually speak of
forgiveness, even where they state the doctrine correctly and omit any mention of
forgiveness the courts insist on saying that forgiveness is the important factor.38
SSThe Cal. Statute provides there can be no condonation of cruelty by cohabitation "unless
accompanied by an express agreement to condone." Hunter v. Hunter, 30 Pac. 590 (Cal., 1892).
And see Bordeaux v. Bordeaux, 30 Mont. 36, 75 Pac. 524 (1904) and Saville v. Saville, 103 Ore.
117, 203 Pac. 584 (1922), applying similar provisions.
36Shaffer v. Shaffer, 181 N. W. 261 (Iowa, 1921); Sackner v. Sackner, 224 Mich. 615, 195
N. W. 311 (1923) ; Shirley v. Shirley, 87 Ark. 175, 112 S. W. 369 (1908) ; Toulson v. Toulson,
93 Md. 754, 50 Ad. 401 (1901) ; Costello v. Costello, 191 Pa. 379, 43 Ad. 240 (1899).
And see
Phillips v. Phillips, 91 Ga. 551, 17 S. E. 633 (1893) ; Land v. Mullin, 46 La. Ann. 1246, 15 So.
657 (1894).
3
SEven in New Jersey and Massachusetts the cases since Rogers v. Rogers and Holsworth v.
Holsworth talk of the need for forgiveness: See Rushmore v. Rushmore, 12 N. J. Misc. 575, 174
Ad. 469 (1934) ; Giles v. Giles, supra n. 27.
SFor example the Pennsylvania statute provides, "In any action or suit for divorce for the
cause of adultery, if the respondent shall .....
.prove .....
.that the libellant . . . . has admitted the respondent into conjugal society or embraces after he or she knew of the criminal fact, . . .
itshall be a good defense." Act of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, sec. 52; 23 Purdon St. sec. 52. This act
contsnues the provision of the Act of Mar. 13, 1815, P. L. 150. Yet in Gosser v. Gosser, 183 Pa.
499, 503, 38 Ad. 1014 (1898) it is said, "Condonation may be inferred from cohabitation after
knowledge ..... Forgiveness implies a knowledge of the offense to be forgiven and there can be no
condonation without a belief in guilt and an intention to forgive it." And see Talley v. Talley, 215
Pa. 281, 64 Ad. 523 (1906). The cases actually decided that there was no condonation where no
intercourse after knowledge and condonation where there was intercourse. And see Wright v.
Wright, 6 Tex. 3, 21-23 (1851) (construing a similar statute).

too
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A clear avowal by the courts that condonation is simply voluntary sexual
intercourse after knowledge of the marital offense in question and a cessation by
them of the use of forgiveness terminology would do much to remove the doubts
and uncertainty apparently surrounding the doctrine and would prevent in the
future unsatisfactory decisions like Thompson v. Thompson.
CONDONATION OF CRUELTY

One further question requires comment. That is, whether more is required
for the condonation of cruelty than for the condonation of adultery. More
specifically, will one act of voluntary sexual intercourse condone all prior cruel
treatment as it will prior adultery? Prefatory to answering this, certain subsidiary considerations should be noticed. As distinguished from adultery, cruelty and especially "indignities to the person" consist of a course of conduct over
a period of time "so that something of a condonation of earlier ill treatment must
in such cases necessarily take place;" 39 and a wife who continues marital cohabitation in the hope of a cessation of such mistreatment should not be deprived of
divorce when that hope is not realized. 40 The avoidance of such an unjust result does
not preclude the application of condonation to cruelty, however, but merely calls
for the application of the well settled principle that condonation is upon the
implied condition of future conjugal kindness. It is, therefore, the almost universal
rule that condonation applies to cruel treatment, 41 and that any subsequent cruelS9Owens v. Owens, 96 Va. 192, 195, 39 S. E. 72, 74 (1898).
401d.: and see McLanahan v. McLanahan, 104.Tenn. 217, 56 S. W. 858, 861 (1900).
4
lGardner v. Gardner, 2 Gray (Mass.) 434 (1854); Note (1921)
14 A. L. R. 931. It has
been held in Pennsylvania that the doctrine of condonation has no application to cruelty or indignities. In Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Pa. 449 (1847) (divorce a mnensa et thoro) the court so concluded
by applying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to the statute, which expressly provided for condonation of adultery, but made no such provision for cruelty. If that is the law, where
a husband is guilty of cruelty, but the wife continues to live with him and he reforms and treats
her with kindness ever after she could still at any time leave him and obtain a divorce for his early
cruelty. It is interesting to note that the later Pennsylvania cases do not give such a strict result to
the Hollister case, but construe it as merely meaning that condonation does not apply to cruelty in
the same sense that it does to adultery; i. e., that condonation is applied to cruelty "with this proper
qualification, that any conduct, which, after a reconciliation of the parties, creates reasonable apAugenstein v. Augenstein, 45
prehension of personal violance, will revive the condoned cruelty."
And see Lacock v. Lacock, 74 Pa. Super. 378 (1920); Epstein v.
Pa. Super. 258, 264 (1911).
Epstein, 93 Pa. Super. 398 (1928). In Moore v. Moore, 7 D. & C. 423 (Pa., 1926), the court goes
into an exhaustive discussion of the question and concludes that the real rule of the Pennsylvania
cases is that there may be a condonation of cruelty or indignities, though it is of course conditional.
In all of these Pennsylvania cases there was misconduct -after the cohabitation. If the situation sug-.
gested above should arise in Pennsylvania today it is felt that it would be held that the cruelty was condoned. The language in the early case of Hollister v. Hollister should not preclude the courts
today from falling in line with the doctrine adhered to in all other jurisdictions. Contra to Hollister
The Texas statute is the same as that of Penn.
v. Hollister is Wright v. Wright, 6 Tex. 3 (1851).
sylvania, but the court refused to apply the expressio unius maxim, saying that as to cruelty "we
may with propriety recur to the doctrines of the Canon law . . . on the subject" (at p. 21).
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or misconduct not in itself sufficient to warrant a divorce, but creating a
reasonable apprehension that the cruelty will be repeated, or simply showing lack
of reformation by the condonee,'4 wipes out the effect of the condonation and
revives, for the purposes of divorce, all misconduct occurring prior to the condonation. A second principle, particularly applicable to cruelty, is that condonation must
be voluntary. Thus, if a wife is cruelly treated by her husband, and out of fear of
physical injury, submits to his demands for intercourse such is not voluntary nor
effective as a condonation. 4 4 The oft-stated rule that condonation will not be construed so strictly against the wife, on analysis will be seen to be merely a specific application of this principle, the wife being more subject to compulsion and being de45
pendent upon her husband for protection and support.
In the vast majority of cases where the defense of condonation has been
pleaded to the libel alleging cruelty, cruelty or other mistreatment following the
marital cohabitation has been shown and hence the defense held invalid. 46 Of the re47
mainder, in some the alleged cohabitation is shown to have been not voluntary,'
and in others the defense has been sustained where the marital cohabitation was
long continued after the last instance of ill treatment. 48 But few cases, therefore,
present the situation where there is but one or a few acts of intercourse after cruel
treatment and persistent good conduct by the condonee thereafter. These we will
consider.
In Weber v. Weber,'49 the husband being guilty of adultery, cruelty, indignities, and habitual drunkenness, his wife left him. She refused to return but ad42Deusenberry v. Deusenberry, 82 W. Va. 135, 95 S. E. 665 (1918) ; Estel v. Estel, 34 Okla.
305, 125 Pac. 455 (1912); Note (1921) 14 A. L. R. 939.
43Jefferson v. Jefferson, 168 Mass. 456, 47 N. E. 123 (1897) ; Cochran v. Cochran, 93 Minn.
284, 101 N. W. 179 (1904); Young v. Young, 323 Il1. 608, 154 N. E. 405 (1926); Hilbert v.
Hilbert, 177 At. 914 (Md., 1935). Cf. Abbot v. Abbot, 192 111. 439, 61 N. E. 350 (1901).
Compare the rule that condoned adultery is revived by conduct which looked adulterous: Apgar v.
Apgar, 59 At. 230 (N. J. Ch., 1904).
4 4
Harnett v. Harnett, 55 Iowa 45, 7 N. W. 394 (1880); Wolverton v. Wolverton, 163 Ind.
26, 71 N. F. 123 (1904) ; Norman v. Norman, 88 W. Va. 640, 107 S. E. 407 (1921).
4
6See Hickman v. Hickman, 188 Iowa 697, 176 N. W. 698 (1920); Shirey v. Shirey, 87 Ark.
175, 112 S. W. 369, 372 (1908). Actual force or even fear of physical injury need not be shown.
Contnued cohabitation impelled by fear for the well being of her children, by financial dependence
upon her husband, by physical inability to leave due to illness, etc. may be sufficient to treat it
as really not voluntary. See Egidi v. Egidi, 37 R. I. 481, 93 At. 908 (1915) ; Saville v. Saville.
103 Ore. 117, 203 Pac. 584 (1922).
46Sisterhen v. Sisterhen, 60 Iowa 301, 14 N. W. 333 (1882); Davies v. Davies, 55 Barb.
(N. Y.) 130 (1869); Tackaberry v. Tackaberry, 101 Mich. 102, 59 N. W. 400 (1894)1 Teal v.
Teal, 324 111. 207, 155 N. E. 28 (1926); and cases cited supra notes 42 and 43. Cf. Reese v.
Reese, 23 Ala. 785 (1853) (facts showed cruelty continued until bill filed, but court speaks of no
condonation rather than revival).
4'Supra, notes 44 and 45.
48
Price v. Price, 127 Ark. 506, 192 S. W. 893 (1917) ; and see Davis v. Davis,
206 S. W. 580 (Mo. App., 1918) ; Root v. Root, 164 Mich. 638, 130 N. W. 194, 195 (1911).
49195 Mo. App. 126, 189 S. W. 577 (1916).
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mittedly slept with him two different nights. The court held that a divorce was
properly granted to her on her cross bill, saying 5O
"Cohabitation offers strong evidence of such pardon . . . increasing
in probative force with the fulness of knowledge of the offense
committed and the length of time continued. In most cases where
the cohabitation is long continued, it will be taken as conclusive
.The nature of the conjugal offense has much to
evidence ......
do with this question. In cases of adultery condonation from cohabitation is more nearly conclusive than in cases of cruelty or indignities.
In Wolverton v. Wolverton, 163 Ind. 26, 35, 71 N. E. 123, 126, the
court said, 'A distinction has been properly made between actions for
divorce on account of conjugal infidelity and actions for divorce for
cruelty, and it has been held by courts of other states that a condonation of extreme and repeated cruelty will not be inferred from a single
act of sexual intercourse.'-"1
This decision is considerably weakened, however, by the later language 52 of the
court to the effect that, "If there had been a condonation he was the first to violate
it. The wife was summoned into court on false charges made by him for the purpose
of securing a divorce." 53 An early Tennessee case 5 4 was very similar in its facts and
was decided in the same way, but in it, too, the court emphasized the fact that the
husband in his libel maliciously accused her of adultery. The doctrine that one act
65
Opof intercourse will not condone cruelty is supported by several other cases.
50Id., 189 S. W. at 578.
51The language quoted from the Wolverton case was merely dictum, for the decree there was
based upon the fact that the intercourse was not voluntary; and of the five other cases cited in
Weber v. Weber for the doctrine there stated none support it.
52189 S. W. at 579.
53
That false and malicious charges made by a husband in his bill for divorce against the wife
is cruelty see Note (1927) 51 A. L. R. 1191.
54Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Cold. 124, 42 Tenn. 92 (1865).
55 Cox. v. Cox, 52 Hun 613, 5 N. Y. S. 367 (1889); Doe v. Doe, 52 Hun 405, 5 N. Y. S.
514 (1889); and see Beebe v. Beebe, 174 App. Div. 408, 160 N. Y. S. 967 (1916); Diedrich v.
Diedrich, 68 Neb. 534, 94 N. W. 536 (1903) ; Phillips v. Phillips, 1 111. App. 245 (1878). In
all of these there was evidence of subsequent mistreatment, or the case was decided on other
grounds, relegating the statement of the rule to the category of dicta. This is the rule in California:
Hawkins v. Hawkins, 286 Pac. 747 (Cal., 1930), but the California statute specifically requires
a "restoration to all marital rights," plus an express agreement, for the condonation of cruelty.
In the case of Quient v. Quient, 105 Wash. 315, 177 Pac. 779 (1919) it was held that continued
cohabitation until the institution of the action would not condone cruelty. This is tantamount
to holding that condonation is not applicable at all to cruelty, though the court indicates that the
husband's treatment of her never showed any signs of improving. In an earlier case, Johnsen v.
Johnsen, 78 Wash. 423, 139 Pac. 189 (1914) cohabitation for over a year was held to have condoned cruelty.
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posed to these are a few cases holding that one act of sexual intercourse will condone
56
cruelty the same as adultery.
Though the majority of the cases which have touched upon this problem seem
to support the rule as stated in Weber v. Weber it is difficult to justify this view.
True, there are differences between the offense of adultery and that of cruelty and
as a result, coerced cohabitation or revival of prior offenses will be found more often
where the latter offense is present. The differences, however, merely have an
effect upon the result obtained by applying the general rule of condonation and do
not call for a different rule for the different offenses. The courts seem to fear
in these cases that a wife who is patient will be denied relief because of her forbearance; but to require a long continued cohabitation after the mistreatment has
ceased is not needed to avoid this result anymore than it would be necessary to
abolish condonation altogether in the case of cruelty. If the wife voluntarily and
freely cohabits with her husband after he has treated her cruelly and he thereafter
treats her with kindness she has nothing to fear and the law need be no more solicitous toward her than toward a wife who does likewise after her husband's known
adultery. She has elected to go on with the marriage in the hope that he will
reform and her hope has been realized. If, on the other hand, he thereafter
repeats his misconduct, so that she has reason to fear physical injury or further
indignities to her person, she will be protected from that by application of the
principle that condonation is conditional. The rule stated in these cases seems
to be the result of a failure to appreciate the significance and effectiveness of the
two subsidiary principles in accomplishing a just result. The rule also has the
disadvantage of leaving open the question as to how much cohabitation is necessary to condone cruelty.
From this analysis of the actual decisions and consideration of the human
interests involved, the following may be hazarded as a fair and correct exposition
of what constitutes condonation: When a spouse is guilty of adultery, or of
cruelty or indignities sufficient to constitute a ground for divorce, then if, and
only if, the injured spouse, with knowledge thereof, voluntarily has sexual intercourse with the guilty one, such is condonation of the marital offense or offenses.
Carlisle, Pa.

Frank Eugene Reader

56Rushmore v. Rushmore, 168 Atl. 614 (N. J., 1933), but see Rushmore v. Rushmore, 12
N. J. Misc. 575, 174 Ad. 469 (1934); Cf. Clague v. Clague, 46 Minn. 461, 49 N. W. 198

(1891) (lived in same room a few days) ; see Holsworth v. Holsworth, 252 Mass. 133, 147 N. E.
578, 579 (1925); Dunn v. Dunn, 26 Neb. 136, 42 N. W. 279, 281 (1889); Shirey v. Shirey, 87
Ark. 175, 112 S. W. 369, 372 (1908).

